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TO TITHE OR NOT TO TITHE: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TITHING IN A CHAPTER
13 BANKRUPTCY BUDGET
I. INTRODUCTION
The free exercise of religion, which enjoyed expanded constitu-
tional protection in the 1960s and 1970s,' suffered a series of set-
backs in the late 1980s.2 Any doubt about the existence of this trend
should have been dispelled in 1990 when the Rehnquist Court ren-
dered its decision in Employment Division v. Smith (Smith H).' The
effect of the decision, which denied the appellants an exemption for
the religious use of the drug peyote,' was to essentially unseat Sher-
bert v. Verner5 as the leading case for constitutional challenges' to
government actions which burden the free exercise of religion.' In
1. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1512 (11 th ed. 1985). See State of Ohio
v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976) (state's attempt to regulate all activities of a non-public
religious school is a violation of the First Amendment prohibition of free exercise of religion);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish youths granted religious exemption from
compulsory high school attendance); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (government
cannot condition receipt of benefits on an individual's willingness to violate cardinal principles
of her religious beliefs).
2. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439 (1989) (gov-
ernment may log on land used by Native Americans for religious purposes even though the
logging interferes with those practices); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)
(prison officials need not grant inmates excuse from work requirements to attend religious
services); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (religious exemption to statute requiring Social
Security numbers for welfare recipients need not be granted).
3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 56-61. This case will be
referred to throughout the comment as Smith M to distinguish it from an earlier United States
Supreme Court decision on the same case, Employment Division v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660
(1988). In the earlier case (Smith I), the Court refused to rule on the religious freedom claim
and remanded the case to the Oregon court to determine whether the sacramental use of peyote
was proscribed by Oregon law. The Oregon court held that the religious use was prohibited by
Oregon law, but that the prohibition was not valid because it violated the Free Exercise
Clause. The Oregon court's decison was appealed and in Smith II, the United States Supreme
Court ruled on the religious freedom issue. Smith IH, 494 U.S. at 874.
4. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 56-68.
5. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. This prohibition against government
interference with religious freedom was extended to the states through the 14th amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Exercise Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 865,
873 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
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Sherbert, the Court ruled that an individual could not be denied gov-
ernment benefits because of conduct motivated by religious beliefs.8
The United States Supreme Court had spent the twenty-seven
years since Sherbert developing a test for determining the constitu-
tionality of state statutes which burden the free exercise of religion.9
Before Smith II, the test was clear: state-imposed burdens on reli-
gious conduct encroached on the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and strict scrutiny was required. 0 The test applied re-
gardless of whether the burden was a prohibition against religious
conduct or a denial of a government benefit because of religious con-
duct. 1 The issue in each case was whether the state's interest was
sufficiently compelling to justify this encroachment on individual re-
ligious liberty. 2 Today, due to the Court's decision in Smith H, the
issue is no longer so clear.
In Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II), the Court rejected
Sherbert as the applicable test for state burdens on religious con-
duct. a" In Smith II, the Court upheld a decision by the Oregon State
Employment Division denying unemployment compensation benefits
to individuals who were fired from their jobs for using the hallucino-
genic drug peyote in a Native American religious ceremony. 4 Al-
though the Court did not repudiate Sherbert outright, it did raise
serious questions as to when Sherbert's strict scrutiny test is applica-
ble. 5 The Smith II Court made it clear that strict scrutiny is not
8. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 38-49.
10. Galloway, supra note 7. Under strict scrutiny, the government must show a compel-
ling interest to justify its action. In addition, the action must be both effective and the least
onerous means of achieving the compelling interest. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
11. See infra notes 12 and 138-50 and accompanying text.
12. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)
(since state failed to show compelling interest in denying unemployment benefits to individual
who quit job rather than violate religious prohibition against work on the Sabbath, the denial
was unconstitutional); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (government's interest in
uniform funding of the Social Security system is sufficiently compelling to justify denial of
religious exemptions to mandatory participation); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1981) (government's interest in denying public support to racial discrimination in educa-
tion is sufficiently compelling to justify the burden of denying tax-exempt status to a religious
institution); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (since state failed to show compelling
interest in denying unemployment benefits to individual who quit job because of religious con-
victions, the denial was unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (govern-
ment's interest is not sufficiently compelling to deny exemption for Amish children from com-
pulsory high school education).
13. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
14. Id. at 872.
15. Although the Court was clear in its ruling that the Sherbert analysis was not appro-
priate in regard to criminal statutes, it did not directly rule on the applicability of Sherbert as
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required when the religious conduct in question violates a general
criminal statute. 6 Less clear is whether Sherbert can continue to be
used as a basis for challenging the constitutionality of a state action
that denies government benefits because of non-criminal conduct en-
gaged in due to religious beliefs.'" The question is an important one
because the erosion of the Sherbert test with respect to civil statutes
could significantly limit future attempts to expand the arena of reli-
gious conduct which is protected by the First Amendment. 8
Among the unsettled free exercise of religion questions that
could be affected by the Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II)
decision is the constitutionality of allowing religious tithing' 9 as part
of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy budget.2" Currently, the bankruptcy
courts2 are divided on the issue of whether debtors can be denied
approval of a Chapter 13 plan because they insist on including a
tithe to their church in their proposed budget. 2 Most of the bank-
ruptcy courts which have denied debtors the right to tithe have sim-
to civil statutes. Instead, the Court explained the limited historical use of Sherbert and left
open the question as to its future use. Id. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
16. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
17. "[W]e [the Court] would not apply it [Sherbert] to require exemptions from a gener-
ally applicable criminal statute." Id.
18. Before Smith II, the individual usually had to show only that a government action
had imposed a burden or denied a benefit because of belief or conduct required by religion.
Strict scrutiny was then required. The government often failed the test and the individual
received an exemption from the government rule. Galloway, supra note 7, at 875, 878. After
Smith II, strict scrutiny will not usually be required. Obviously, without the requirement of
strict scrutiny, the government will be able to withstand challenges it could not under a strict
scrutiny standard.
19. Tithing is the practice of giving a percentage, traditionally ten percent, of an indi-
vidual's annual income to a church or religious organization. THE LIVING WEBSTER ENCY-
CLOPEDIC DICTIONARY TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1033 (5th ed. 1977). Although the term
tithing broadly refers to any tax or assessment of one-tenth, in this comment its use will be
restricted to the practice of regularly contributing a percentage of one's income to a religious
organization.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1990). Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor
proposes a strict budget, under which all "excess disposable income" must be devoted to repay-
ing creditors. This budget is an essential part of the debtor's repayment plan, which is subject
to the bankruptcy court's approval. DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE, §§ 19.12, 19.19 (1987).
21. Bankruptcy cases are generally heard by special bankruptcy courts, which are a
"unit" of the federal district courts. HENRY J. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.5.1 (3rd ed. 1988).
22. Compare In re Green, 73 B.R. 893 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (tithe allowed over
creditors' objections) and In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (tithe allowed as
reasonably necessary part of debtor's maintenance and support) with In re Reynolds, 83 B.R.
684 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (tithe permissible but limited to a maximum of three percent of
gross income) and In re Sturgeon, 51 B.R. 82 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985) (confirmation of a
Chapter 13 budget denied because of inclusion of a tithe).
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ply ignored the constitutional aspects of the problem." Those ad-
dressing the constitutional question have based their analysis on the
Sherbert line of cases."' As yet, neither the United States Supreme
Court nor any federal circuit court has ruled on the issue.25 The
apparent weakening of Sherbert raises questions as to what stan-
dards or guidelines will be available to the appellate courts when
they do tackle the issue. Yet, it is likely that the tithing question will
reach the appellate courts in the near future given the dramatic in-
crease in bankruptcy appeals over the past few years."
This comment will explore the implications of Employment Di-
vision v. Smith (Smith II) for challenges to the government's limita-
tion of the free exercise of religious expression in general and the
question of tithing in a Chapter 13 budget in particular. A historical
development of the Sherbert line of cases will be followed by a brief
explanation of the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith
(Smith II) and a summary of the current unsettled state of the tithing
issue in Chapter 13. The comment will then analyze the possible
and probable implications of Employment Division v. Smith (Smith
II) on the future viability of Sherbert v. Verner as a precedent in
free exercise of religion cases. Finally, the comment will show why
Sherbert does survive Smith II as the appropriate test in the tithing
issue and how it can be used to support the proposition that, under
certain circumstances and within specific guidelines, a debtor must
be allowed the constitutional right to tithe under Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy statutes.
23. See In re Sturgeon, 51 B.R. at 82; See also In re Curry, 77 B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1987). See infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
24. See In re Green, 73 B.R. at 893; See also In re Miles, 96 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988).
25. The United States Constitution provides for a uniform national bankruptcy law.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy
and, therefore, bankruptcy appeals are made to the federal appellate courts. COWANS, supra
note 20 at § 1.1-2.0. In December 1990, the Ninth Circuit issued an unpublished opinion in
which the tithing question was at issue. In re Ivy, No. 88-3769 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the
Ninth Circuit did not rule on the religious freedom issue, noting that the bankruptcy court had
offered the debtors an amended plan which would allow the tithe and still be fair to the
creditors. The court ruled that the debtors' refusal to accept the amended plan resulted in their
failure to satisfy the bankruptcy code requirements. Id. For a discussion of the bankruptcy
code requirements, See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.




A. Historical Development of the Sherbert Test
The United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled that
government may not regulate religious beliefs."' In early cases, the
Court seemed to impose an absolute ban on government attempts to
restrict religious beliefs while allowing the government nearly abso-
lute power to restrict conduct motivated by religious beliefs."8 Later,
in Cantwell v. Connecticut,9 the Court retained the belief-conduct
distinction, but seemed to abandon the view that conduct was wholly
outside of First Amendment protection. 0 Instead, the Court sug-
gested that religious conduct might be protected under certain cir-
cumstances."1 Over the next quarter century, the Court seemed skep-
tical about whether religiously motivated conduct was protected,
sometimes ruling that it was, sometimes ruling that it was not."2
Finally, in 1963, the Court unambiguously stated in Sherbert v.
Verner that conduct motivated by religious beliefs is protected by the
First Amendment. 3 In Sherbert, the Court ruled that the claimant,
a Seventh Day Adventist who was discharged because she refused to
work on the Sabbath, was unconstitutionally denied unemployment
compensation benefits. 4 The state's employment commission had
27. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("The door of the Free Exercise
Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs. ") (empha-
sis in original); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) ("The freedom to hold religious
beliefs and opinions is absolute."); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489, 496 (1961) (state
constitution requiring that notary public declare belief in God before commission could be
granted is a violation of United States Constitution); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
162 (1878) (First Amendment deprives the government of all legislative power over mere reli-
gious opinion).
28. "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious opinions, they may with practices." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
29. 310 U.S. 296, 302-03 (1940) (state statute that gave the government the power to
determine if solicitation of funds were for religious purposes before granting the certificate
needed for the solicitation was an infringement on the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment).
30. Id. at 303-04.
31. "Thus, the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id. The Court noted, as an exam-
ple, that the state could not completely prohibit the right to preach religious views, but that it
could set the time, place and manner of religious soliciting. Id. at 304.
32. Compare Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (city ordinance prohibit-
ing religious address in public park is unconstitutional) with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 599 (1961) (state statute prohibiting sale of retail goods on Sunday does not interfere with
religious freedom of those whose religion prohibits work on Saturday).
33. 374 U.S. at 404.
34. Id. at 409
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ruled that the appellant's refusal to work on Saturday because of
religious restrictions disqualified her under the state's provision
prohibiting the receipt of benefits by individuals who refused "with-
out good cause" to accept available work.3 5 The Court said that to
condition the receipt of government benefits upon the claimant's
"willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith ef-
fectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." 6
The Court ruled that such an encroachment on constitutional liber-
ties is prohibited unless the state can show a compelling interest that
requires the limitation."
Sherbert's compelling interest test was affirmed and refined by
the Court in later cases. 8 For instance, in Thomas v. Review Board
of the Indiana Employment Security Division,89 the Court ruled that
the State of Indiana had illegally denied unemployment compensa-
tion benefits to a claimant who quit his job rather than be forced to
help fabricate turrets for military tanks.40 The claimant, a Jehovah's
Witness, had refused the work because his religious beliefs prohib-
ited him from working on weapons of war.41 The state's hearing
officer for unemployment benefits found that the claimant quit due
to religious convictions, but denied compensation because "volun-
tary" termination did not meet the "good cause" requirements of the
Indiana statute.' 2
This decision was upheld by the Indiana State Supreme Court,
but was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.48 The United
States Supreme Court ruled that denial of the benefits was an in-
fringement on the claimant's right to free exercise of religion. 44 Since
the State could show no compelling interest served by the denial,
such a denial was unconstitutional and therefore prohibited.4 The
35. Id. at 401.
36. Id. at 406.
37. Id. In Sherbert, the interest offered by the state was protection against the "possibil-
ity" that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous individuals feigning religious objec-
tions to Saturday work would dilute the compensation fund and hinder the scheduling by
employers of necessary Saturday work. The Court ruled that these interests were not suffi-
ciently compelling. Id. at 407.
38. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
39. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
40. Id. at 720.
41. Id. at 709-10.
42. Id. at 711-12.
43. Id. at 712, 720.
44. 450 U.S. at 720.
45. Id. at 719. The interest offered by the state was twofold: (1) to avoid widespread
unemployment and the burden on the fund that would result if people were permitted to leave
jobs for "personal reasons," and (2) to avoid a probing into a job applicant's religious beliefs
1236 [Vol. 32
Court in Thomas said:
Where the State conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such
a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief,
thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement
upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial."
Furthermore, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission
of Florida,47 the Court relied on its previous decisions in Sherbert
and Thomas, declaring that the denial of benefits because of conduct
mandated by religious beliefs is a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and is prohibited, absent a proof of
compelling state interest." The Court expressly rejected a less rigor-
ous standard, stating that "[bloth Sherbert and Thomas held that
such infringements must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be
justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest." '49
B. The Strict Scrutiny Test
The strict scrutiny analysis developed in Sherbert, Thomas and
Hobbie is a two-prong test. 50 Initially, the appellants must show that
they have been disadvantaged by government action because of relig-
iously motivated behavior, then the government must show that it
satisfies the two strict scrutiny requirements. 1 The government must
first prove that its action (prohibition or requirement of conduct or
denial of benefit) was taken to further an actual compelling purpose
and that the action is an efficient means of achieving that purpose.5 2
Next, the government must show that the action taken is necessary,
by employers. The Court did not find either interest sufficiently compelling to justify the bur-
den on the claimant's religion. Id. at 718-19.
46. Id. at 717-18.
47. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
48. Id. at 139-40. The claimant, a Seventh Day Adventist, was discharged for refusing
to work on the Sabbath in violation of her religious beliefs. She was denied unemployment
benefits by the State. The State ruled that her refusal to work on the Sabbath was work-
related "misconduct" and that she was, therefore, ineligible for benefits. The Court found this
to be a violation of the claimant's constitutionally-protected free exercise of religion. Id. at 138-
39.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Russell W. Galloway, Means-Ends Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21
Lov. L.A. L. REv. 449, 453 (1987).
51. Galloway, supra note 7, at 869-72.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 36-49.
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that is, narrowly tailored and the least restrictive method of achiev-
ing the important purpose." Until Smith II, this strict scrutiny test
was the general rule for the majority of cases in which the govern-
ment placed a burden on the free exercise of religion." ' Whether the
test is still appropriate after Smith H will be discussed later in this
comment."5
C. Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II)
The facts in Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II) were un-
controverted." Two Oregon residents were fired from their jobs at a
private drug rehabilitation center for ingesting peyote for sacramen-
tal purposes during a ceremony at their Native American church.5
When the fired employees applied for unemployment compensation
benefits they were denied by the State of Oregon under a statute
which disqualified employees fired for work-related misconduct."
The employees claimed that they were entitled to a religious exemp-
tion from the law prohibiting the use of the peyote and that the state
could not deny them unemployment benefits for the religious use of
the drug." In making this argument, they relied on Sherbert, Hobbie
and Thomas, claiming that a state cannot condition government ben-
efits on an individual's willingness to forego conduct mandated by his
religion.60
The Oregon Supreme Court had found in favor of the employ-
ees, ruling that Oregon's prohibition of the use of peyote for sacra-
mental purposes was invalid under the free exercise clause and that
unemployment benefits could not be denied because the employees
engaged in that practice.61
The United States Supreme Court overruled the Oregon court,
holding that Sherbert did not apply to requests for religious exemp-
53. Galloway, supra note 7, at 875-76.
54. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 36-49.
55. See infra notes 138-64 and accompanying text.
56. 494 U.S. at 872.
57. Id. at 874.
58. Under Oregon law at the time, it was illegal to knowingly possess a controlled sub-
stance, such as peyote, without a medical prescription. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1991).
Violation of this law was considered by the employer of the drug rehabilitation clinic as work-
related misconduct. In 1991, the Oregon Legislature revised the law, legalizing the use of
peyote in religious ceremonies. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5).
59. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 875.




tions to a generally applicable criminal law."2 The Court returned to
Reynolds v. United States,'3 stating that it has consistently held that,
although government actions cannot interfere with religious beliefs
or opinions, they can interfere with religious practices."' In Smith II,
the Court stated that, "[w]e have never held that an individual's reli-
gious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.""5
Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion, noted that the law
prohibiting use of peyote was not directly aimed at the religious
practice in question." Since it was not the objective of the law to
prohibit or burden religion, the "incidental" burdening caused by an
otherwise valid law was not a violation of the First Amendment.17 In
other words, since Oregon has the right to regulate the use of drugs,
it also has the right to impose that prohibition without regard or
exception for religious beliefs." Strict scrutiny was not required in
the case.6
The Court rejected the Sherbert proposal that "all laws burden-
ing religious practices should be subject to compelling-interest scru-
tiny."'70 The Court also rejected the argument that strict scrutiny is,
at the least, required when the prohibited conduct is "central" to the
individual's religion. 1 Justice Scalia said that it would not be any
more appropriate for judges to decide the "centrality" of a religious
belief before determining if strict scrutiny was required than it
would for them to decide the "importance" of an idea before decid-
ing if strict scrutiny was required in a free speech challenge.72 The
Court said that it has repeatedly warned that judges must not pre-
sume to determine how important a belief is to a particular
religion.7
62. Id. at 884.
63. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the appellant claimed a
religious exemption from a criminal prohibition against bigamy. The Court ruled that no reli-
gious exemption to criminal bigamy was allowed. Id. at 166.
64. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 878-80.
65. Id. at 878-79.
66. Id. at 882.
67. Id.
68. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 890.
69. Id. at 885.
70. Id. at 884.
71. Id. at 886.
72. Id. at 886-87.
73. Id. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 492 U.S. 933 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-05 (1979);
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1944).
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Justice Scalia emphasized the point by explicitly rejecting the
view, presented by Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion, that
the Court should consider the constitutional significance of the bur-
den.7 " The Court claimed that this was simply "centrality" under
another name.75 The Court used the same argument to reject Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion that the courts should not ignore the
"severe impact" that a government regulation might have on an indi-
vidual's religious practice.7 6
The Court asserted that if the strict scrutiny test is to be applied
at all to generally applicable laws, it must apply "across the board,
to all actions thought to be religiously commanded."'7  Justice Scalia
stated that "[any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy. '7 '8 The Court concluded by stating that religious exemp-
tions to generally applicable laws were permissible, but that the po-
litical process, not the courts, was the appropriate forum for creating
those exemptions. 7
Justice Scalia did not go so far as to say that the Court was
completely abandoning Sherbert's compelling interest test.80 He
pointed out that the test was developed "in a context that lent itself
to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the rele-
vant conduct"8 and implied that it must be restricted to that context.
Justice Scalia emphasized the fact that the Court has "never invali-
dated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test ex-
cept the denial of unemployment compensation."8 He pointed out
74. Smith 1I, 494 U.S. at 887, n.4. Although Justice O'Connor does not explicitly ex-
plain what she means by constitutionally significant, she does argue that "the First Amend-
ment at least requires a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of
each particular claim." Id. at 889.
75. Id. at 887 n.4.
76. Id. (quoting Blackmun, J., dissenting)("I do not think this means that the courts
must turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a state's restrictions on the adherents of a minor-
ity religion.").
77. Id. at 888.
78. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 888.
79. Id. at 888-89. The Court admitted that leaving the decision to legislatures may place
the adherents of minority religions at a "relative" disadvantage. However, the Court said this
was unavoidable and preferable to "a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs." Id. at 890.
80. The Court did not state that it was overruling Sherbert, but seemed to leave some
room for it's continued viability in stating, "[elven if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert
some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require
exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law." Id. at 884.
81. Id.
82. 494 U.S. at 883.
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that in all other cases where Sherbert was applied, the test was
found satisfied and the challenged statute was upheld.8" Scalia con-
ceded that the Court "sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test
in contexts other than that [unemployment compensation]," but
quickly added that "we have always found the test satisfied." 4
Scalia emphasized the point by noting that, in recent years, the
Court has refused to apply Sherbert to any case other than the un-
employment compensation area.8" Yet, as will be noted later in this
comment, he did leave open a small window for possible expansion
of Sherbert's compelling interest test to other areas, such as tithing
under Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
D. The Tithing Issue
An understanding of a few basic bankruptcy principles is
needed to appreciate the tithing controversy.88 Chapter 13 is the
bankruptcy repayment plan.87  In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a
debtor's monthly income is divided into two categories: disposable
and non-disposable income. 8 Non-disposable income is income re-
ceived by the debtor and which is required for the maintenance or
support of the debtor or the debtor's family.89 The debtor is required
to draw up a budget, showing exact dollar amounts needed each
month for these necessary maintenance and support expenses.90 All
other income is considered disposable income and must be devoted to
83. Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Gillette v. United States 401
U.S. 437 (1971)).
84. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
85. Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 467 U.S. 693 (1986) (Sherbert test not applicable to stat-
ute requiring benefit applicants and recipients to provide a Social Security number); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (Sherbert test not applica-
ble to logging and road construction by government on land used for religious purposes by
Native Americans)).
86. Since arguments against the inclusion of a tithe are based on bankruptcy rules, an
understanding of these rules is critical to understanding the controversy.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1321. Consumers generally file one of two types of bankruptcy: a
Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13. Under Chapter 7, referred to as straight bankruptcy, all of the
debtor's non-exempt assets are liquidated (usually at a greatly discounted rate) and the pro-
ceeds are divided among creditors. Most unsecured debts are discharged, providing the debtor
with the "fresh start" which is the stated statutory purpose of bankruptcy. SOMMER, supra
note 21 at §§ 6.1.1-6.2.1.6. Chapter 13 is the repayment plan explained above. See supra text
accompanying notes 88-100. The tithing controversy does not arise under Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy since the debtor is free to expend future funds as he or she desires once discharge has
been granted. SOMMER, supra note 21, at § 3.6.
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repaying the debtor's creditors.9 The minimum required length of
the repayment plan is three years and the maximum is five.9
Unsecured debts" not completely repaid at the end of the re-
payment period are discharged, which means the debtor is relieved
from the obligation to make further payments on the discharged
debts. 4 This usually results in the unsecured creditors receiving only
a portion of the money owed to them.9 5 The bankruptcy code miti-
gates this seeming unfairness by granting the Chapter 13 trustee and
the unsecured creditors who do not receive full repayment the right
to challenge the inclusion of items in the debtor's budget which the
creditor believes to be frivolous, excessive or unjustified. 96 When
such an objection to confirmation is filed, the bankruptcy court must
determine whether the challenged item qualifies under the code as
"reasonably necessary" 9 for maintenance or support.98
The court's decision is relatively simple when the challenge is to
material items such as luxury cars, expensive private schools and un-
usually high amounts for recreation.9 9 The courts have consistently
ruled that these kinds of expenses are not reasonably necessary for
the maintenance and support of the debtor or the debtor's family and
have refused to confirm plans which include them.' 00
However, the question can become much more difficult when
the expense objected to is a tithe to the debtor's church, especially if
the debtor claims that tithing is mandated by his or her religious
beliefs.' In this situation, the question evolves beyond the "reasona-
91. Id.
92. 91 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988).
93. Unsecured debts are debt obligations which are not secured by pledged collateral.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1539 (6th ed. 1990).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
95. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judi-
ciary, House of Representatives, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 - A Before and After Look
45 (1983) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Report].
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1).
97. The 1984 amendment to the bankruptcy act defines "luxury goods or services" as
those which are not reasonably necessary. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(c) (1990). A necessary corol-
lary to that definition is the principle that all other expenses are "reasonably necessary." SoM-
MER, supra note 21, at § 12.3.3.
98. COLLIER, 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1325.08.
99. In re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (continuing payments on a
$17,000 sports car purchased before bankruptcy is a luxury); In re Hedges, 68 B.R. 18
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) ($9,000 pleasure boat was a luxury item and therefore debtor's pay-
ments on debt secured by boat were not reasonably necessary); In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ($1,000 monthly payment for private school and college tuition was a
luxury and not reasonably necessary for maintenance and support).
100. Id.
101. In these cases, the debtor is claiming that a tithe is reasonably necessary for his or
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bly necessary" test to a possible constitutional issue: the debtor's
church says he or she must tithe, but the bankruptcy court says the
debtor cannot tithe and file Chapter 13.1"2 This puts the debtor in
the position of choosing between following the precepts of his or her
religious beliefs and receiving the government benefits of Chapter 13.
This is exactly the kind of choice the Court said is prohibited in
Sherbert, Thomas and Hobbie.'08
The tithing controversy has not been universally treated as a
constitutional question by the courts '0 The bankruptcy courts are
divided, not only on whether tithing should be allowed but also on
how the issue should be analyzed." 5 The bankruptcy court in Mich-
igan treated the problem as a constitutional issue in In re Green,10
allowing a tithe over the creditors' objections." 7 Citing Hobbie, the
court ruled that "denial of confirmation solely because the debtors
propose to tithe would be unconstitutional."10 8 The court stated that
to condition confirmation of the debtor's bankruptcy plan on an
agreement to cease tithing would be to put pressure on the debtor to
violate her religious beliefs and "such a burden on religion can be
justified only by proof of a compelling state interest."' 0 ' The court
could find no compelling state interest to justify the denial and or-
dered confirmation of the budget with the tithe.110
However, in In re Reynolds,"' the Missouri court dismissed
the Green free exercise argument as "obiter dictum" and denied con-
her maintenance and support.
102. The question becomes constitutional because the debtor is claiming that the govern-
ment violated his constitutionally-protected free exercise of religion.
103. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
104. See cases cited supra note 22.
105. See cases cited supra note 22.
106. 73 B.R. 893 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). The debtor claimed that her church and
her religious beliefs required her to tithe. She contended that she should, therefore, be permit-
ted to include a tithe in her Chapter 13 budget. The Court agreed that the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment required that she be allowed to include the tithe.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 895. But See, David W. Case, Comment, Resolving the Conflict Between
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Free Exercise Clause - In re Green: A Step in
the Wrong Direction, 57 Miss. L.J. 163 (1987) (although the Green court appropriately used
the strict scrutiny test, it failed to take into consideration the legitimate government interests of
protecting third parties from injurious acts).
109. 73 B.R. at 896.
110. Id. The state did not argue that a compelling interest existed which would justify
the burden on religious expression. Instead, the state claimed that granting the right to tithe
would be a violation of the First Amendment's establishment clause. The court rejected this
argument. Id. at 894-95.
111. 83 B.R. at 684. (A church contribution is not a "reasonably necessary living ex-
pense" but should be considered a part of the debtor's disposable income).
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firmation of a Chapter 13 plan because the debtor had included a
tithe in the budget.11 2 Instead, the court focused on the "reasonably
necessary" criteria and decided that "some nominal amount will be
permissible, but that amount will need to be below 3% of gross in-
come unless very unusual circumstances are present.""'
The, Pennsylvania bankruptcy court, in In re Navarro,"" al-
lowed the tithe, but said that no constitutional issue was involved. 15
In Navarro, the court concluded that some level of religious or char-
itable expenditures could be construed as "reasonably" necessary for
the maintenance or support of Chapter 13 debtors.' 6 The court
noted that the principle of including religious contributions in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy budget was "implicitly recognized by the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States which promulgated the official
bankruptcy forms and schedules used by Chapter 13 debtors.")M7
The court added that, although "these forms do not have the force of
substantive law ... it is significant that official Form 10 includes an
entry for 'religious and other charitable contributions.' """ The
court stated that its decision was not based on any constitutional
grounds but on the finding that the tithe was a reasonably necessary
part of this particular family's maintenance and support."' The
court explicitly stated that because it was not the role of the bank-
ruptcy court to award or deny substantive government benefits, no
constitutional issue was involved.' 20
The Navarro court then proceeded to explain that, even if a
bankruptcy discharge is deemed to be a government benefit, denial of
Chapter 13 confirmation would be constitutionally permissible since
the debtor could file a Chapter 7 liquidation plan, which would not
preclude a tithe. 2 ' The judge further stated that "[e]ven if I were to
decide that strict scrutiny is appropriate, I would find that applica-
tion of section 1325(b) here serves a compelling government interest:
that being administration of the bankruptcy system and protection of
the legitimate interests of creditors.' 2 2
112. Id. at 684-85.
113. Id. at 685.
114. 83 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
115. Id. at 352.
116. id. at 356.
117. 83 B.R. at 356.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 357.
120. Id. at 352.
121. Id. at 353. See supra note 87.
122. 83 B.R. at 353.
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The Indiana court ignored the constitutional issue in a 1985
case, In re Sturgeon.23 The objecting creditor in Sturgeon was the
mother of a young man who was killed in an automobile accident
caused as a result of the debtor's drunken driving.' 4 The court de-
nied the debtor's proposal to include tithing as a necessary living
expense, stating that the court believed that "it would be more just
and more noble a gesture' ' 2 5 to offer the funds to the grieving
mother to help pay for burial expenses.' 6 The court never men-
tioned the constitutional issue, apparently basing its decision on sym-
pathy for the mother and the fact that the court did "not believe that
there is any church law requiring this donation ....,"'" The New
Mexico court, in In re Tucker, 28 relied heavily on the Sturgeon
decision in finding that religious tithes were not reasonably necessary
for the maintenance and support of the debtor and, therefore, not
allowable.'2 9
The bankruptcy court in southern Florida also avoided the con-
stitutional issue in In re Curry,'3 by emphasizing the voluntary na-
ture of the tithe. 8 ' The judge said that he did not doubt the sincerity
of the debtor's religious convictions, but insisted that the tithe was a
voluntary charitable contribution which did not "constitute a reason-
ably necessary living expense."' 82 The judge denied confirmation of
the plan.'" However, he suggested that if the debtor deleted the
tithe, confirmation would be granted since "[iln all other respects,
the plan meets the requirements for confirmation.' " Florida's
northern district directly addressed the constitutional issue in In re
Miles.' That court rejected the Green holding, stating that there
was no constitutional protection for "debtors who with the ability to
make payments to their creditors choose instead to donate those
funds to their church."' 3
The opinions from other bankruptcy courts reflect similarly di-
123. 51 B.R. 82, 84 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1988).
124. Id. at 83.
125. Id.
126. 51 B.R. at 83-84.
127. Id. at 83.
128. 102 B.R. 219 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1989).
129. Id.
130. 77 B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 969-70.
133. Id. at 970.
134. Id.
135. 96 B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989).
136. Id. at 350.
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vergent views. 187 It is apparent that the current state of the case law
regarding tithing under Chapter 13 is uncertain and confusing for
both debtors and bankruptcy judges. Debtors who wish to file a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proposal and who feel compelled to tithe are
at the mercy of the individual bankruptcy judge, who currently is
free to rule on the matter according to his or her own views on the
issue. In addition, the judges themselves have little guidance, except
for the body of conflicting cases noted here.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Tithing Under Chapter 13 Is a Constitutional Issue
It is difficult to understand how the bankruptcy courts in
Navarro, Sturgeon, Curry, Miles and Reynolds could deny or ignore
the constitutional aspects of the Chapter 13 tithing question."8 In
determining whether the free exercise clause is applicable to a case,
two issues must be addressed: (1) whether the conduct or belief in
question was religiously motivated, and (2) whether the government
imposed or denied a benefit because of that conduct or belief.1 9
The answer to the first question should be self-evident in the
tithing controversy: the debtor's decision to include a tithe in the
Chapter 13 budget is conduct motivated by religious beliefs.1 40 The
answer to the second question, though not self-evident, is clearly
"yes." A Chapter 13 confirmation is and was meant by Congress to
be a benefit. This intent was clearly indicated in the House Report
accompanying H.R. 8200:
The benefit to the debtor of developing a plan of repayment
under chapter 13, rather than opting for liquidation under
Chapter 7, is that it permits the debtor to protect his assets. In a
liquidation case, the debtor must surrender his nonexempt as-
sets for liquidation and sale by the trustee. Under chapter 13,
137. See, e.g., In re Bien, 95 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (tithe allowed because it
was a requirement for being a member of the Mormon Church); In re Gaukler, 63 B.R. 224
(Bankr. D. N.D. 1986) (tithe allowed as debtor need not give up good faith religious beliefs
and obligations in order to qualify for bankruptcy).
138. Denial of the tithe is clearly a government action which prohibits an individual
from carrying out a religious belief. If the individual claims a religious exemption to the prohi-
bition, the question must be a constitutional one. The disagreement should be about whether
strict scrutiny is required, not about the nature (constitutional v. non-constitutional) of the
question.
139. Galloway, supra note 7, at 869.
140. Of course, if it can be shown that the debtor has included a tithe for non-religious
purposes (eg., to deprive his creditors of the funds), then the debtor fails this part of the test
and the free exercise analysis is not applicable.
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the debtor may retain his property by agreeing to repay his
creditors. Chapter 13 also protects a debtor's credit standing far
better than a straight bankruptcy, because he is viewed by the
credit industry as a better risk. In addition, it satisfies many
debtors' desire to avoid the stigma attached to straight bank-
ruptcy and to retain the pride attendant on being able to meet
one's obligations.1" 1
Another benefit of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 liquidation is
that some debts are dischargeable under Chapter 13 which are not
dischargeable under Chapter 7"42 In addition, the Chapter 13
debtor can stretch out payments of non-dischargeable debts and of
secured arrears (eg., home and auto loans) over a longer period than
might otherwise be possible under Chapter 7.4 The advantages
(benefits) of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 are critical because, if de-
nied confirmation of Chapter 13, the debtor is left with only two
choices: either file the less advantageous (i.e., less beneficial) Chapter
7 liquidation or forego bankruptcy all together. Since Chapter 13
has obvious advantages (benefits) over either of these alternatives,
denial of Chapter 13 is denial of a government benefit."'
B. Strict Scrutiny is the Appropriate Test in Analyzing the Tithing
Issue
According to the Sherbert line of cases, the analysis should now
proceed directly to compelling interest scrutiny. 4 However, as noted
above, Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II) casts doubt as to
whether the Sherbert strict scrutiny test is still the correct analy-
sis.1 46 Clearly, it would not be if the challenged government action
(prohibition of a tithe under Chapter 13) involved a generally appli-
cable criminal statute.1,47 The question which arises is whether Em-
141. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6079, (emphasis added).
142. These debts include some taxes, debts incurred under false pretenses or fraud and
some student loans. SOMMER, supra note 21, at § 6.3.2. In addition, the Chapter 13 stay
prohibits creditors from moving against certain co-detors of the debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 1301
(1988).
143. Under Chapter 7 liquidation, priority creditors (such as the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice), who do not receive full payment of non-dischargeable debts can recommence their efforts
to collect the balance of the debt as soon as discharge is granted. Under Chapter 13, priority
creditors must wait and receive their monthly payments under the plan. SOMMER, supra note
21, at § 6.3.2.
144. Bankruptcy is regulated by 11 U.S.C. § 1001-1330 (1988).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 33-49.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 61-85.
147. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990).
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ployment Division v. Smith (Smith II) also restricts the use of the
Sherbert compelling interest test in religious exercise challenges to
non-criminal statutes and regulations such as the tithing issue. Al-
though the Court noted the criminal nature of the challenged Oregon
statute in Smith II,148 there is nothing in the language of the opinion
which suggests that the Court intended to limit the holding to crimi-
nal statutes.' 49 The Court emphasized, "our conclusion that gener-
ally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burden-
ing a particular religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest .. .must stand."' 50
The Court could easily have used the phrase "religion-neutral
criminal laws." It chose not to. Throughout the opinion, the Court
refers to generally-applicable laws, consistently omitting the adjective
"criminal."'' It is difficult to believe that this was a mere oversight,
especially since there is considerable evidence in the opinion that the
Court fully intended its ruling to apply to civil statutes as well as to
criminal ones. For example, the Court used primarily civil cases
when listing situations in which the Sherbert test was not applica-
ble."5 2 The Court warns that insisting on the Sherbert strict scrutiny
test for governmentally imposed burdens on religiously-motivated
conduct would require "religious exemptions for civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind."' 53
The Court was careful to note that Sherbert had never been
used successfully to overturn any civil statute or invalidate any gov-
ernment action except in unemployment compensation cases.'" This
strongly suggests that the Court was sending a rather explicit warn-
ing to steer clear of any assumptions about the automatic applicabil-
ity of strict scrutiny in any case where the government was placing a
burden on religious conduct, regardless of whether it was a criminal
or civil matter. Justice Blackmun warned of this possibility in his
dissent noting that the "Court views traditional [Sherbert] free exer-
cise analysis as somehow inapplicable to criminal prohibitions ...
and to state laws of general applicability."' 55 Blackmun also noted
that the cases cited by the majority, "hint[ed] that the Court has
148. Id.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 149-53.
150. Smith I, 494 U.S. at 886, note 3.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 882-83. See cases cited supra note 2.
153. Id. at 888.
154. Id. at 882-83.
155. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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repudiated that standard altogether." '166
Yet, it is the very language which the Court uses to explain
why Sherbert has been limited to unemployment compensation cases
that offers hope for its expansion. The Court notes that the Sherbert
test was "developed in a context that lent itself to individualized gov-
ernmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."' 57
The Court explains that one of the distinctive elements of unemploy-
ment compensation programs is that the eligibility standards require
that the particular circumstances of each applicant be considered. 5 8
The Court went on to state that its decisions in the unemployment
compensation cases stood for the "proposition that where the State
has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason."'
159
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is a context which lends itself to indi-
vidualized assessment.' 60 Congress intentionally drafted language
that would allow the bankruptcy courts to review the particular cir-
cumstances of each individual debtor."' In Sherbert and Thomas,
the "system of individualized exemptions" was provided by the
"good cause" standard. 6 In Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the "system of
individualized exemptions" is provided by the "reasonably necessary
for the maintenance and support" standard for disposable income. 63
This standard allows bankruptcy judges to tailor a repayment plan
to the needs of each debtor, 6 just as the "good cause" standard al-
lows unemployment compensation officers to evaluate each individ-
ual's reason for unemployment.
Obviously, Chapter 13 bankruptcy has the same distinctive fea-
ture of individualized review which entitles challenges to unemploy-
ment programs to strict scrutiny. The Court's own language, there-
fore, suggests that, even after Smith II, the Sherbert compelling
interest test remains the appropriate analysis for determining the
156. Id.
157. Id. at 884.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. "The bill permits great flexibility in the formulation of the plan." H.R. Rep. No.
95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6084.
161. COLLIER, supra note 98, § 1325.08 at 1325-50.
162. The statutes provided that individuals were not eligible for unemployment compen-
sation if they had quit work or refused available work "without good cause." Smith II, 494
U.S. at 884.
163. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (1988).
164. COLLIER, supra note 98, § 1325.08 at 1325-50.
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constitutionality of allowing a tithe in a Chapter 13 budget.
C. A Complete Prohibition on Tithing is not Justified Under Strict
Scrutiny
As explained above, strict scrutiny is a two-prong test.1" 5 First,
the government conduct (here, denial of the right to tithe) must be
supported by a compelling interest and the conduct (denial) must be
a substantially effective means of achieving that purpose.166 Second,
the government must show that the denial is the least onerous alter-
native available for furthering the compelling interest. 67
1. Effective Means of Achieving a Compelling Interest'
For purposes of this comment, it will be assumed that the gov-
ernment does have a compelling interest: the integrity of the bank-
ruptcy system and/or the financial interest of the unsecured credi-
tors, who potentially will receive a smaller percentage of their claims
if a tithe is allowed."' It is questionable, however, whether the gov-
ernment satisfies either the second component of the first prong, or
the second prong.
There is no evidence that denial of the right to tithe in a Chap-
ter 13 budget furthers either the integrity of the bankruptcy system
or substantially increases the percentage of the claims received by
unsecured creditors. Congress included provisions in the bankruptcy
code which addressed both of these concerns. In order to qualify for
Chapter 13, the debtor's repayment plan must result in the creditors
receiving at least as much as they would under a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion.' 6 ' This requirement, referred to as the "best interests of the
165. Galloway, supra note 7, at 873-74.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 874.
168. These are the compelling interests mentioned by the bankruptcy court in In re
Navarro, 83 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) and the ones most likely to be offered by
creditors and the bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 353. It should be noted that a strong argument can
be made that these interests are not sufficiently compelling to pass the first prong of the Sher-
bert analysis. However, such a discussion is not necessary here, as it will be shown later in this
comment that the government fails to satisfy the second prong of strict scrutiny.
169. SOMMER, supra note 21 at § 12.3.1. Consider, for example, the debtor whose non-
exempt assets under Chapter 7 total $10,000. This is the amount creditors would receive under
Chapter 7 liquidation. If the debtor files Chapter 13 and does not tithe, the debtor could
contribute $300 a month to repayment. After 36 months, the debtor would have contributed
$10,800 to his creditors. The plan would be eligible under the best interests of the creditors
test. However, if the debtor tithed in the amount of $140 per month to the church, the debtor
would only be able to contribute $160 per month to the repayment plan. After five years, the
maximum allowable length of Chapter 13 plans, the debtor would only have paid $9,600 to his
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creditors" test, was inserted by Congress to ensure that unsecured
creditors would not be harmed by the debtor's decision to file under
Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7.'"
In addition, Congress included provisions which required (1)
that the debtor file a detailed plan,' 7 ' (2) that the creditors be al-
lowed to object to the debtor's classification of exempt versus non-
exempt assets, 1 2 and (3) that the plan be administered by a neutral
trustee.'73 These provisions should be an adequate response to the
unfounded claims that allowing tithing as a necessary expense would
somehow cause injury to the integrity of the bankruptcy system or
work to the substantial detriment of the unsecured creditors.
There is, however, reason to believe that denial of the right to
tithe will result in unsecured creditors actually receiving less money
when a tithe is denied. Those who are denied Chapter 13 confirma-
tion have the right to file a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy in-
stead.' 74 Debtors who are denied confirmation because of their insis-
tence on tithing are likely to accept this option.' 7 5 Studies have
shown that unsecured creditors usually receive nothing under Chap-
ter 7 liquidation.1' The average payback to unsecured creditors
under Chapter 13 is fifty-seven percent of the debt owed.' 7 7 This
suggests that denial of the right to tithe under Chapter 13 actually
serves to undermine the compelling interest (an increased payment to
unsecured creditors) which the government would be using to justify
the burden on religious expression. Therefore, the tithing prohibition
fails the means test. Even if it were assumed that a prohibition
against tithing did meet the means test, the prohibition still fails
under Sherbert's second prong.
creditors. The plan will not be approved because the creditors receive less under Chapter 13
than they would under Chapter 7 (In reality, administration costs would be deducted from the
repayment amounts under both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13).
170. Id.
171. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1988).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (1988).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
174. Bankruptcy Report, supra note 95.
175. If debtors sincerely believe that they must tithe, then the only way they can follow
their religious precepts and still receive some of the benefits of bankruptcy is to file for Chapter
7. Under Chapter 7, unsecured creditors have no claim to any of the debtor's future income.
Once the debtor's non-exempt assets have been liquidated and the proceeds distributed to cred-
itors, the debtor is discharged from most unsecured debts. The debtor is free to use future
income to tithe in any amount the debtor desires. SOMMER, supra note 21 at § 12.3.3.
176. Bankruptcy Report, supra note 95.
177. Id.
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2. Least Onerous Method
The second prong, the alternative means part of strict scrutiny,
requires that the government use the least onerous method of fur-
thering its compelling interest.1"8 If an equally effective method is
available and that alternative places less of a burden on the individ-
ual's free exercise of religion, the government must use the less bur-
densome alternative.' 79 It is here that an absolute prohibition of tith-
ing under Chapter 13 certainly fails the strict scrutiny test. It is
difficult to visualize a more restrictive means of achieving the govern-
ment's interest: the religious debtor either stops tithing or forfeits the
benefits of Chapter 13. As noted above, such drastic measures cannot
be justified if an effective alternative exists.
D. Extension of the Repayment Period is not an Effective
Alternative
An alternative which has already been suggested is that the re-
payment period be extended.' 80 This suggestion aims at resolving
two issues: the "best interests of the creditors" problem 8' and the
concern that the tithe could substantially reduce the amount a credi-
tor would get under Chapter 13 if the debtor did not tithe.' 8' Under
the extended repayment theory, the non-eligible debtor 8" would be
permitted to file Chapter 13 and to tithe. To qualify for this exemp-
tion, however, the debtor would be required to make smaller pay-
ments'"' over a longer period of time. The debtor would continue to
make payments until the creditors had received as much as they
would have received under a Chapter 7 plan.'85 The debtor who
does meet the best interests test could also tithe, but would be re-
quired to make payments over a longer period of time to "compen-
178. Galloway, supra note 7 at 875.
179. d.
180. Bruce Edward Kosub & Susan K. Thompson, Note, The Religious Debtor's Con-
viction to Tithe as the Price of a Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEX. L. REV. 873, 903 (1988).
181. Id. Creditors must receive at least as much under Chapter 13 repayment as they
would under Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988).
182. Kosub, supra note 180. Since the tithe is money that would theoretically go to the
creditors if the debtor did not tithe, it can be argued that the tithe reduces the creditors
payment.
183. The term "non-eligible debtor" refers to the debtor who is not eligible for Chapter
13 because the best interests of the creditors test cannot be met. See supra note 166 and accom-
panying text.
184. Obviously, the monthly payments to creditors would be smaller than the payments
would be if the debtor was not tithing.
185. Kosub, supra note 180, at 902.
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sate" for the money the creditors "lost" due to the debtor's decision
to tithe."8'
This alternative has two disadvantages. First, it defeats the
fresh start purpose of bankruptcy. 187 Although the advocates of this
alternative mention this drawback, they dismiss it by suggesting that
a "reasonable" extension would be acceptable.' 88 They make no at-
tempt to define what would be a reasonable extension, nor do they
suggest any limits on the bounds of an extension. Courts generally
are reluctant to confirm Chapter 13 plans that extend more than a
few months beyond the minimum three years.18" Five year plans
usually are confirmed only under unusual circumstances."" It is
likely that bankruptcy courts, which are well aware of the inherent
problems of extended plans,"' will be reluctant to confirm plans of
six, seven, eight or more years."'
Secondly, such extended plans place an undue burden on the
debtor. It is difficult enough to live under a stringent budget for
three, four or five years."' The Chapter 13 debtor is not free to
spend money as he or she wishes while under the plan.1"4 The
monthly contributions to repayment must be made."9 In addition, if
186. Id.
187. See SOMMER, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
188. Kosub, supra note 180, at 902.
189. Id.
190. Id. An exception is made in some jurisdictions, such as the San Francisco Bay
Area, where living costs are high. In such jurisdictions, longer plans (four and five years) are
often proposed and approved when the priority and secured arrears are large and the excess
disposable income is small. Courts realize the practical realities and conclude that Chapter 13
is still the best alternative. Id.
191. The major inherent problem is that debtors become discouraged and do not follow
through on the plan. In addition, it is difficult to plan for income changes and other changes in
circumstances, such as babies, illness, layoffs, etc., over a long period of time. The longer the
plan, the more likely disruptive events will occur. Bankruptcy Report, supra note 95.
192. Since the maximum repayment period is already five years, it would probably take
a period of six to ten years to make up for the "shortfall" caused by anything more than the
most insignificant tithe. Consider, for example, a debtor who has a monthly income of $2,000.
His religion requires him to tithe 10 percent (S200) to the church. His other reasonable and
necessary expenses total $1,400. This leaves $400 per month of disposable income that will be
repaid to the creditors each month. During a five year plan, the tithing debtor would pay a
total of $24,000 (60 payments of $400 each) to the creditors. If the debtor did not tithe, he
would have paid back $36,000 (60 monthly payments of $400 each). In order to make up for
this $12,000 "shortfall," the debtor would have to continue on the plan for an additional 24
months. Forcing a debtor to undergo seven years of a strict repayment plan can hardly be
characterized as accomplishing the "fresh start" that the bankruptcy rules are supposed to
provide.
193. See supra text and accompanying notes 86-101.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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the debtor's income increases during the repayment period, the credi-
tor or the trustee can seek an amendment granting a higher monthly
repayment during the remainder of the term.1 Forcing the debtor
to undergo these conditions for an extended period of time because of
his or her exercise of religious beliefs could raise a separate issue
about the constitutionality of placing such a burden on religiously-
motivated conduct.
In addition, allowing special extensions of the time period for
tithing is likely to initiate demands for extensions for other reasons.
The debtor who has a sick child and high monthly medical expenses
might be a deserving candidate for an extended payment plan. It
could be reasonably argued that, if these medical expenses prevent
the debtor from meeting the best interests of the creditor test and,
therefore, are the only obstacle to Chapter 13 approval, then this
debtor should be given a time extension. Certainly, this debtor is as
deserving of an extension as the tithing debtor. Some unsecured cred-
itors, such as small business owners, may also be sympathetic candi-
dates for time extension requests. Perhaps they should be permitted
to ask that the debtor's plan be extended if a non-tithing debtor's
proposed plan does not give them full repayment.
It is only the naive individual who will honestly believe that one
exception, even if constitutionally grounded, will not give birth to
additional exceptions, especially when the exception is for something
as seemingly innocuous as a small extension of time. Yet, a prolifera-
tion of extensions could greatly restrict the value of bankruptcy for
scores of debtors who would struggle for six, seven or even ten years,
vainly searching for the elusive fresh start promised by bankruptcy.
For these reasons, it should be obvious that the extended payback
period is not a suitable alternative to a prohibition of tithing under
Chapter 13.
IV. PROPOSAL
Unlike the proposed time extension, the establishment of strict
eligibility guidelines for tithing under Chapter 13 would be a suita-
ble and effective alternative to a total prohibition. These guidelines
could be designed to allow tithing to a limited class of qualified debt-
ors while, at the same time, protecting both the integrity of the bank-
ruptcy laws and the legitimate interests of the unsecured creditors. In
this section, four principles which could be used as a starting point
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1988). See SOMMER, supra note 21, at § 12.3.3.
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in establishing these guidelines will be suggested.
First, the courts should require that debtors base their right to
tithe on the fact that tithing is mandated by the debtor's religious
beliefs. Debtors who merely "choose" to tithe should not be eligible.
This distinction is justified because the constitutional protection ex-
tends only to those who are forced to choose between following the
precepts of their religious beliefs and receiving a government bene-
fit. 197 Debtors who only prefer to tithe, but are not required to do so,
would be similar to individuals who quit their jobs rather than work
on Sunday because they prefer, but are not required by their reli-
gion's rules, to go to church. If these individuals apply for unem-
ployment compensation benefits, they will likely be denied.'98 They
will not find any refuge or protection in Hobbie, Thomas or Sherbert
since the Court, in these cases, clearly limited constitutional protec-
tion only to those whose challenged conduct was required by their
religious beliefs.199 Neither should a debtor receive an exception to
the disposable income test because of a voluntary decision to tithe.
There is simply no case or statutory authority on which to base such
a claim.
Second, the Court should require that the debtor prove the
sincerity of his or her religious belief that he or she must tithe to the
church. The constitutionality of a sincerity requirement for religious
objections has been established by the Court. 00 In United States v.
Seeger,20 ' the Court said that although the "truth of a belief is not
open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is
'truly held.' This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be
resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact."' ' 2
There are several factors which the courts could use to deter-
mine the sincerity of the debtor's belief that tithing is required. The
courts could look to the actual rules or laws of the debtor's church.
Does the debtor's church have a written rule that members must
tithe or do the rules merely "encourage" tithing? Do all or most of
the members of the debtor's church tithe? What are the church rules
197. See generally, Galloway, supra note 7.
198. Most unemployment statutes deny benefits if the individual does not have "good
cause" for quitting. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). No cases were found which accepted a "desire" to attend
church services as "good cause."
199. See supra text accompanying notes 33-49.
200. See, e.g. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 185.
19921 1255
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regarding the consequences of the debtor's failure to tithe? Of course,
the presence or absence of written church rules cannot, by itself, be
determinative of a debtor's sincerity. That would too closely resemble
the "centrality test" that the Court prohibited in Smith H.20a The
church rules and policy, written or unwritten, should be just one
factor in ascertaining the debtor's sincerity.
The courts could also look to how long the debtor has been tith-
ing as a means of determining sincerity. If the debtor has been faith-
fully tithing for the past ten years, there is probably little reason to
doubt sincerity. But, there is a question as to the sincerity of a debtor
who previously did not tithe and who suddenly, on the eve of bank-
ruptcy, is enlightened about the necessary role that tithing plays in
his spiritual salvation.
Setting a length of time, previous to filing for bankruptcy, dur-
ing which the debtor must have tithed regularly to the church is also
a possible means of establishing sincerity. This would be consistent
with other bankruptcy rules. 0 For example, property transfers
made during the year before filing are considered suspect and may
be set aside.20 5 The court could establish either a "reasonable length
of time" standard for pre-bankruptcy tithing or a set length of time
of one or more years.206
Third, the court should continue to require that the debtor meet
the "best interests of the creditors test" which requires that creditors
receive at least as much under Chapter 13 as they would under
Chapter 7.20 The test should be left intact for three reasons: (1) the
test is a statutory requirement and not within the power of the court
to change, (2) it directly furthers the two compelling government in-
terests at stake here, 08 and (3) to do otherwise would be to give the
tithing debtor a "bonus" benefit. Debtors who have high monthly
medical bills and who, as a consequence, cannot pay their creditors
as much under Chapter 13 plans as the creditors would receive
203. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
204. See infra text accompanying note 203.
205. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(1990).
206. Ideally, the length of time would be set by Congress. However, there is no indica-
tion that Congress, which amended the code in 1984, has any intention of subjecting the code
to review in the near future. This particular issue, although important, probably is not of
enough significance to prompt Congressional action, especially since Congressional considera-
tion of a tithing exception is certain to raise calls for other exceptions.
207. See supra note 169.
208. Those interests are the integrity of the bankruptcy code and the financial interests
of the unsecured creditors. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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under Chapter 7 are not eligible for Chapter 13.29 They must file
the less attractive Chapter 7.21o There is no constitutional basis for
treating the tithing debtor differently. The denial of Chapter 13 con-
firmation would not be based on the decision to tithe but on the
debtor's failure to qualify under the general rules. Admittedly, it is
the decision to tithe which makes the debtor financially ineligible.
However, this is an incidental effect of a religion-neutral law and, as
the Court pointed out in Smith II, there is no constitutional right to
an exemption from these kinds of generally applicable laws.211 Smith
II also states that strict scrutiny is appropriate only when the law
provides for individualized government assessment of the reasons for
the conduct.21 2 Chapter 13 does not provide for an individualized
assessment of the reasons for the debtor's failure to meet the "best
interests of the creditors" test.2"' Creditors either would receive as
much under Chapter 13 as they would under Chapter 7 or they
would not receive as much. The debtor either passes the test or does
not pass it. The reasons are apparently irrelevant.
Finally, the debtor must meet all other Chapter 13 require-
ments, including any threshold issues of eligibility.21 Since the
debtor's claim to a religious exemption is based on the argument that
a tithe is a reasonably necessary expense for his or her maintenance
and support, the exemption should apply only to that requirement.
There is no constitutional basis or logical reason to relieve. the debtor
from other Chapter 13 rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II) has severely limited
the use of the strict scrutiny test in constitutional challenges to gov-
ernmentally imposed burdens on the free exercise of religiously-mo-
tivated conduct. However, even a broad reading of Smith II allows
for the application of strict scrutiny in the case of a civil statute
which provides for individualized assessment of the prohibited con-
duct. Since the disposable income standard of a Chapter 13 plan does
209. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988).
210. SOMMER, supra note 21, at § 12.3.1-12.3.3.
211. Smith I1, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
212. Id.
213. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988).
214. Threshold requirements of eligibility include (1) the debtor must have a regular
income, (2) the debtor's non-contingent, unliquidated unsecured debts must total less than
$100,000, and (3) the debtor's non-contingent, unliquidated secured debts must total less than
$350,000. 11 U.S.C. 109 (e). See Sommer, supra note 20, at § 12.2.
1992] 1257
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allow for the individualized assessment of a debtor's proposed Chap-
ter 13 budget, strict scrutiny is appropriate when a budget item is
questioned"'B and the debtor claims that item was included because
of a sincere religious conviction.
Debtors who insist that their religious beliefs require that they
tithe to the church cannot be unilaterally denied confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan solely because of the proposal to tithe. Strict scru-
tiny must first be applied. Under strict scrutiny, the government ar-
guably meets the compelling interest and (less arguably) the effective
means components of the test. However, the government fails the
final component because a total prohibition of tithing is not the least
onerous means of achieving the compelling interests (the integrity of
the bankruptcy system and the financial interests of the unsecured
creditors). The government can achieve these ends and preserve the
debtor's constitutionally-protected right to free exercise of religion by
implementing guidelines that will limit tithing to debtors with a le-
gitimate religious claim.
Carol Koenig
215. Actually, specific budget items are not "prohibited." The budget is scrutinized to
see whether the "excess disposable income" test is met. If items are included in the budget
which are determined to be not "reasonable and necessary for the maintenance and support"
the plan is not approved. The effect is the same as a prohibition of the "offending" items.
1258 [Vol. 32
